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Abstract—Traditional user authentication involves entering a 
username and password into a system. Strong authentication 
security demands, among other requirements, long, frequently 
hard-to-remember passwords. Two-factor authentication aids in 
the security, even though, as a side effect, might worsen user 
experience. We depict a mobile sign-on scheme that benefits from 
the dynamic relationship between a user’s attributes, the service 
the user wishes to utilize, and location (where the user is, and what 
services are available there) as an authentication factor. We 
demonstrate our scheme employing Bluetooth Low Energy 
beacons for location awareness and the expressiveness of 
Attribute-Based Encryption to capture and leverage the described 
relationship. Bluetooth Low Energy beacons broadcast encrypted 
messages with encoded access policies. Within range of the 
beacons, a user with appropriate attributes is able to decrypt the 
broadcast message and obtain parameters that allow the user to 
perform a short or simplified login. 
Index Terms—attribute-based encryption; security; location 
awareness; authentication; bluetooth low energy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The typical sign-on or login procedure to a computer system 
involves a user entering a username and password by means of 
a physical or virtual keyboard. This authentication scheme 
functions by requesting a piece of information that only the 
computer and the user know. Its security relies on the difficulty, 
for an attacker, in obtaining or guessing the password. A 
password’s “strength” is typically evaluated from the length of 
the password in bits (the longer the password, the more time it 
takes for an algorithm to “guess” it by iterating through all 
possible combinations, i.e., brute force) and how distant it is 
from usual combinations, such as dictionary words (usually first 
tested by password cracking algorithms based on dictionary 
attacks). This presents a first issue to the user: employing and 
remembering a sufficiently long, mixed-case, mixed-digit-letter-
special character password that is considered strong. 
As a second issue, in today’s Internet-centric computer 
applications, a user is typically invited to register to dozens of 
websites/applications, each with its own requirements of 
username and password format and length. In an attempt to 
manage the myriad of usernames and passwords, users may be 
tempted to resort to weak passwords, which are easily broken by 
dictionary attacks or brute force, drastically decreasing the 
security of the authentication. A superior approach is utilizing 
password managers, programs that store usernames and 
passwords in an encrypted database, and can also generate long, 
random passwords. Obviously, the password manager itself 
needs a suitable strong master password. Additional security 
may be achieved by multiple-factor authentication, which 
involves entering a password and an extra, temporary 
information, which only the user and the computer know and it 
is shared through a secondary channel. Examples are keychain 
token authenticators, and the sending of temporary codes 
through email or SMS. The results are two-fold: stronger 
security, but more time and work required for user 
authentication and login. 
A third issue emanates from the current’s trend of consumer 
mobile devices that are typically devoid of physical keyboards, 
such as tablets and smartphones taking place of traditional 
desktop computers. Even when utilizing a password manager, 
typing a long, mixed-case, mixed-digit-and-letter password in 
diminutive screen keyboards is a cumbersome task and degrades 
user experience. The experience could be improved if the 
password is simplified (resulting, however, in a weak password), 
or by utilizing biometrics, such as the (yet underutilized) 
fingerprint reader in the mobile device. 
The username/password authentication procedure may be 
viewed from two perspectives. The static one, wherein the login 
process and the system assume a user is at a pre-determined 
location and/or with a pre-determined device, from which the 
user signed on to the system. If the user moves to another 
location and/or switches the login device, then the previous sign-
on is lost and a new sign-on must be performed. The mobile 
perspective is one wherein the user signs on from a mobile 
device and can usually remain logged in to the system if location 
is changed, provided a network connection is maintained while 
moving. While it may seem that, in the mobile version, location 
does not play an important part, location does provide a piece of 
information that we employ to leverage security. 
In this paper, we explore the dynamic relationship among 
these three components: (1) location, i.e., where the user is and 
which services are available to the user in that location; (2) who 
the user is and what attributes the user possesses, i.e., the 
characteristics that can identify the user uniquely or as a member 
of specific groups; (3) which services the user wants to utilize. 
We contribute by employing this relationship as a secondary 
authentication factor that enables solutions for the issues 
presented earlier: (a) allows for a simplified yet secure user 
login, taking into consideration user’s location, desired service, 
and user’s credentials, improving the user experience when 
entering passwords; (b) enables a login session to “travel” with 
the user, such that devices in proximity and different services in 
the same location may “inherit” the login session as the user 
approaches. To capture the dynamic relationship, we construct 
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Loc-Auth, a Location-Enabled Authentication Service that 
employs the expressiveness of Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [1] to encode access policies that 
are built on location, services for the user, and user attributes. 
We demonstrate a case study which relies on Bluetooth Low 
Energy or Bluetooth Smart beacons to construct indoor location 
information and access policy [2]. The user receives the 
transmission of beacons through a Bluetooth Low Energy-
enabled device, such as the smartphone. Access attributes are 
not negotiated with the user at each time before the simplified 
sign-on procedure; the access rules and secure login are encoded 
directly in our usage of the encryption, contributing additional 
expressiveness and flexibility to the secondary authentication 
factor. If the user possesses attributes satisfying the access 
policy, the user will be able to acquire parameters to continue 
with the simplified sign-on procedure. 
The paper proceeds in Section II to survey related work in 
using mobile devices as user authenticators, location sensors, 
and password strength. Section III presents our Location-
Enabled Authentication Service. Section IV discusses our 
contributions and novel algorithms through a case study, and 
Section V analyzes the security of our design. Finally, Section 
VI concludes the paper with future directions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Using mobile devices as a means for access control is the 
topic of a number of initiatives. Near-Field Communication 
(NFC), a technology embedded in some smartphones and 
keycards, has been envisioned as an authentication method for 
payments and as a substitute to passwords [3]. The technology 
works at near range (a few centimeters) and allows for passive 
NFC tags, which harvest energy from the NFC transmitter’s RF 
field. There are also designs proposing the use of cell phones as 
authenticators by employing their SIM cards (which have unique 
identifications), and as one-time-password generators [4, 5]. An 
evaluation of these techniques is presented in [6]. One 
biometric-based solution is Nymi, a bracelet that identifies the 
user’s unique electrocardiogram pattern as an authenticator [7]. 
Upon confirming that the registered user is wearing the device, 
the bracelet communicates with a smartphone, and the related 
application would then authenticate the user to other devices via 
Bluetooth communication. Further security and operation details 
of this device are yet unavailable at the time of writing. ZoneIT 
[8] describes a prototype for controlling the functionality of 
mobile devices based on short-range radio communication 
systems. Base stations installed on premises exchange messages 
with users’ mobile devices for authentication and defining the 
functionality that should be disabled in the area, such as 
ringtones in movie theaters, camera flashes in museums, etc. The 
authors analyze the security of the prototype against common 
attacks, and implementation and business issues. 
Numerous research efforts have been conducted regarding 
indoor localization, which is typically not feasible by means of 
GPS. Auspicious research include localization by means of Wi-
Fi [9] and Bluetooth [10]. These approaches generally involve 
having a mobile device discovering its current location utilizing 
information passed on from stationary objects, such as Wi-Fi 
Access Points and Bluetooth transmitters. 
In [11], the authors discourse on the users’ need of utilizing 
random, strong passwords without re-use. The authors claim that 
using and remembering multiple random, unique passwords is 
not only unfeasible, but also suboptimal, and password 
managers might signify a single point of failure and loss of 
cross-client portability. By utilizing objective functions, the 
authors contend that re-using simple passwords for services and 
sites that do not hold a user’s valuable information is optimal, in 
the sense that it allows a user to dedicate brain memory to 
remember strong passwords utilized for sensitive sites. Our 
Location-Enabled Sign-On offers ways to mitigate these issues, 
by allowing the use of simpler passwords, but augmenting their 
security by capturing, with our algorithms and ABE, the 
convergence of location/user's attributes/services into an 
authentication factor. 
III. THE LOCATION-ENABLED AUTHENTICATION SERVICE 
To enable and realize how location, available services, and 
user’s attributes interrelate as an authentication factor, we build 
the Location-Enabled Authentication Service (Loc-Auth). This 
service, which acts as a trusted party, talks to backend systems 
or services and to the mobile devices, performing the necessary 
functions such that authentication is performed between the 
relying backend system/services, the mobile device, and the 
user. Loc-Auth is better viewed in a framework, composed of 
three layers: the Application Realm, the Location-Enabled 
Authentication Layer, and the Hardware Realm. 
The application realm comprises applications and services 
that require authentication from a user, such as user’s digital 
wallets, merchants’ POS and website systems, and web 
browsers. These applications will utilize Loc-Auth through 
APIs, requesting and receiving authentication information. 
Here, we borrow OpenID’s nomenclature: an application, 
service or website that relies on Loc-Auth for authentication 
information is referred as Relying Party (RP); the user or 
customer is referred as user or end-user. 
The Location-Enabled Authentication Layer implements 
Loc-Auth, including its communication protocols, 
cryptosystems, key exchange, and a token authenticator 
algorithm (a function that generates a number ऄࣽ (the token) 
according to a seed and a message [12]). This layer is 
responsible for interfacing with the application and the hardware 
realms and providing multiple-factor authentication for the user 
and RPs through its key exchange based on the Attribute-Based 
Encryption (ABE) cryptosystem. In ABE, a set of “attributes” 
represents a user’s set of credentials/attributes, and a formula 
with these attributes as input represents an access function. 
Instead of encrypting a ciphertext targeted to a specific secret 
key (as is done in conventional public key encryption), ABE 
produces ciphertexts and secret keys according to user attributes 
and access policies. In this work, we utilize Ciphertext-Policy 
ABE (CP-ABE), in which the attributes are coded into the secret 
keys held by individual users, and the formula over the attributes 
(access policy) is encrypted with the ciphertext [13]. Software 
agents act on behalf of applications from the application realm 
(both on RPs, and on users’ mobile devices). The privacy 
module aims at controlling information sharing with the RPs. 
The main algorithms of the Location-Enabled Authentication 
Layer provide forms of secure key exchange and secure 
broadcast of access policies (using ABE at their core). 
The hardware realm encompasses physical devices, such as 
Bluetooth Low Energy beacons, mobile devices, POS machines, 
etc. This layer abstracts the physical devices as “hardware 
components.” Through this abstraction, the Authentication 
Layer can request services from this layer, e.g., location 
information, without direct regard to the specific hardware 
utilized. 
For the case study, we focus on indoor location; our method 
utilizes Bluetooth Low-Energy beacons and does not require that 
the mobile device knows, or reports, its present location. Loc-
Auth infers the location of a mobile device by utilizing wireless-
delimited broadcast zones, in which the beacons broadcast a CP-
ABE encrypted message. If a mobile device is within that zone, 
and it is able to decrypt the broadcast message, then a key 
exchange is initiated between the mobile device and Loc-Auth, 
through the Bluetooth radios. As battery life is an enduring 
concern for mobile device users, Bluetooth Low Energy poses 
as a concrete technique to implement our zone beacons. The 
practicality of utilizing Bluetooth beacons installed throughout 
an indoor area has been positively demonstrated by large-scale 
deployments of Bluetooth-based beacons such as iBeacons from 
Apple. The range of the Bluetooth’s radio transmission can also 
be used to assist in indoor location granularity or precision. 
Bluetooth class 2 radios, typically the ones used in mobile 
devices, have a theoretical maximum operating range of 10 m 
(for a maximum transmission power of 4 dBm); therefore, a 
mobile device is assumed to be within a beacon’s range if it is 
within 10 m of the beacon. 
IV. CASE STUDY: THE LOCATION-ENABLED SIGN-ON 
We explain the use of Loc-Auth via a case study of location-
enabled sign-on, wherein end users acquire access to backend 
systems by enabling their location as additional authentication 
factor. Bluetooth Low Energy beacons are used to construct 
indoor location information and policy broadcast, and users 
possess a Bluetooth Low Energy device, such as a compatible 
smartphone, to receive the beacons. In this scenario, Bluetooth 
beacons, installed around an office space (as shown in Fig. 1), 
transmit an encrypted message containing a cryptographic 
session token. This token is encrypted using CP-ABE and 
encodes the access rules, through the predicate, that is desired 
for the range of that beacon. A user with a Bluetooth device 
captures the encrypted transmission and attempts to decrypt it by 
utilizing the user’s ABE secret key. If the user has sufficient 
attributes to fulfill the encoded predicate in the ABE-encrypted 
message, then the user device will successfully decrypt the 
message and obtain the token. 
The user is able to realize her location as authentication 
factor and perform a simplified, short-login to a computer or 
another device (such as a VoIP phone) within range of the 
Bluetooth beacon, by utilizing the user’s smartphone to transmit 
a “location sign-on.” The location sign-on procedure is built as 
follows. The office’s backend system registers with Loc-Auth, 
negotiating and generating appropriate security parameters, 
desired attributes and access rules. These access rules for one 
specific floor could be, for instance, “employees of firm XYZ 
AND employees of the financial dept. AND clearance level > 
3.” Users of the office backend system register with Loc-Auth 
and receive security keys and attributes. Examples of attributes 
are “employee marketing dept.”, “clearance level 2,” and 
“intern.” Loc-Auth runs Algorithm 1 to perform the encrypted 
message broadcast through the beacon. The interval between 
broadcasts should be configurable, aiming at striking a proper 
location accuracy and overhead balance. For example, beacon 
intervals in IEEE 802.11 are typically 100 TU (Time Units, 
where 1 TU = 1024 microseconds). 
End-users run Algorithm 2 on their mobile devices. When 
those devices detect a beacon broadcast, they will attempt to 
decrypt the message, obtain data and collect additional 
authentication factors to perform the location sign-on, by 
transmitting the sign-on encrypted data back to the location 
beacons. The c-token is generated with the assistance of the 
token authenticator algorithm. Here, both the end-user and Loc-
Auth share the individual user seed for the algorithm (exchanged 
during registration), and have synchronized clocks. Upon 
receiving a sign-on transmission, Loc-Auth runs Algorithm 3 
and signs-on the end-user with the supplied authentication 
factors (if sufficient authentication was provided). To complete 
the access, the end-user may supply the final authentication 
factor, such as a simplified, short password to nearby terminals 
or devices. The backend system will, as a result, know about the 
end-user’s current location. The signed-in session, as a common 
security procedure, should have an expiration time, after which 
Loc-Auth should request a new location authentication. A 
complete authentication with the location information only 
(without an extra factor such as the simplified password) is not 
always recommended, as any attacker with possession of the 
mobile device would then be able to sign-on on behalf of the 
user. By being smart about mobility, however, we may utilize 
this feature to make the location-enabled login session “travel” 
with the user between contiguous beacon cells through different 
RPs, as will be discussed later. In the case depicted, the beacon 
session token changes periodically and is only known by Loc-
Auth. Both the user’s mobile device and Loc-Auth, however, 
know the seed for the c-token, and this seed is unique to a user 
(thus both Loc-Auth and the user can generate the same c-token). 
A. Characteristics of Location-Enabled Sign-On 
We may highlight the following characteristics about the 
authentication procedures performed by Loc-Auth, as compared 
with other traditional methods: (a) ABE is expressive, allowing 
access rules to be encoded in the message itself based on 
attributes. The message can then be broadcast through insecure 
medium. The primary access decision, then, need not rely on 
database access, or extended communication exchange between 
user and backend, or on specific users (but on “classes” of users). 
Fig. 1: Bluetooth Low Energy radios distributed around an office. 
4'-6"
Bluetooth Low 
Energy radios
The decision is virtually transferred to the user, as a result of the 
user being able, or not, to decrypt the broadcast message. (b) 
Access rules can be changed on the fly simply by re-encrypting 
the new access predicate in the broadcast message. (c) The key 
broadcast using ABE is typically one-to-many, and not one-to-
one as the traditional key exchanges. It should be noted, 
however, that some key exchange protocols, such as Diffie-
Hellman’s, provide key exchange for parties that have no prior 
knowledge of each other. The method described here requires 
that ABE private keys be distributed before through secure 
channels, such that a user can properly decrypt the broadcast 
messages if this user fulfills the predicate. Only beacons that 
broadcast a certain encrypted message accept the sign-on request 
from that decrypted message. 
B. Mobility and Hopping 
If a user is outside of range of Bluetooth beacons, the 
interpretation is that Loc-Auth does not recognize the user’s 
current location. It is then reasonable not to utilize that current 
location as an authentication factor in these situations. As 
mentioned before, the signed-in session has an expiration time, 
after which the location must be authenticated again. This 
procedure addresses beacon hopping, which happens as the user 
moves from one beacon area to another (thus, from one 
“location” to another). Hopping can, in addition, be used in other 
ways: the user agent, running in the mobile device, can 
periodically scan for beacon broadcasts even if the sign-on 
session is active and authenticated with the Service. In different 
RPs that allow for single sign-on, the user may be authenticated, 
in this manner, just by the act of moving within range of that 
second RP, coming from another RP. Hence, the sign-on 
“travels” with the user as she moves. For proper security, the 
location authentication keepalive time should not be long. In 
addition, Loc-Auth may employ a probabilistic analysis of the 
movement, such that the “traveling” or hopping does occur 
between neighboring areas, and not between eccentric, non-
adjacent areas. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
An attacker might utilize numerous vectors to attempt 
maliciously exploiting the mechanisms of Loc-Auth. We now 
analyze the behavior of Loc-Auth in the advent of three forms 
of attacks: replay attack, wormhole attack, and denial-of-service 
(DoS) attack. Our analysis for the first two cases is constructed 
as an interactive game with three players: Loc-Auth, a legitimate 
user, and a malicious attacker. The attacker attempts to gain 
access to the service, obtain information, or disrupt legitimate 
access. 
A. Replay Attack 
Setup. Loc-Auth broadcasts encrypted message ݉  with 
token ऄࣽ at location ݈. An attacker at the same location listens 
to the medium and records ݉ at time ݐ. Also, at this time, a 
legitimate user may listen to the broadcast message and proceed 
with the location sign-on. The attacker does not have knowledge 
of anything (i.e., secret keys, tokens) other than the original 
location ݈ of the broadcast and the time ݐ, and is capable of either 
listening to or transmitting in the channel. The session token 
utilized to generate ݉ is only valid during a time ݀. At time ݐ +
݀, Loc-Auth selects a new session token (and generates a new 
encrypted message), and henceforth message ݉  becomes 
invalid. 
Attack. At time ݐ + ݀ + ߜ , where ߜ > 0 , the attacker 
broadcasts the message ݉  at the same location ݈ , such that 
legitimate users can listen to it. 
Response of the system. A legitimate user listens to ݉. This 
user will run Algorithm 2 and, if possessing the required keys 
and attributes, will reply with the encrypted login (reply message 
݉௥). Both Loc-Auth and the attacker will listen to the reply; the attacker, without knowledge of the secret keys, cannot decrypt 
the reply message ݉௥ . In addition, the reply message for 
message ݉ at time ݐ is essentially distinguishable from the reply 
message ݉௥  for the same message ݉ now at time ݐ + ݀ + ߜ , since the encryption algorithms used to generate the reply 
message are randomized; the attacker cannot infer information 
(e.g., cannot expect the same reply message from the same user, 
given the same message ݉ at any time). 
Algorithm 1: Algorithm run by Location-Enabled Authentication Service for 
broadcast. 
Repeat: 
Generates token for current time period; 
Encrypts token with desired access predicate 
  using ABE; 
Broadcasts ABE(token); 
end Repeat; 
Algorithm 2: Algorithm run by end-user devices to detect beacon 
transmissions and perform location-enabled sign-on. 
Listen to beacon broadcasts; 
Receive ABE(token); 
Decrypt ABE(token) with user’s ABE private key; 
if decryption is unsuccessful then 
goto End:; 
else 
get token; 
Generate c-token for current time period; 
Hash token + password; 
Encrypt hash(token + password) using c-token  
  as symmetric key; 
Encrypt username + c-token(hash(token + 
  password)) using token as symmetric key; 
Send login=token[username +  
  c-token(hash(token + password))]; 
end if; 
End: 
Algorithm 3: Algorithm run by Location-Enabled Authentication Service 
when receiving end-user sign-on. 
Receive user’s login; 
Generate token for current time period; 
Decrypt login and get username using token as 
  symmetric key; 
From username database, get user’s seed and 
  generate current user’s c-token; 
From username database, get user’s password; 
Generate hash(token + password); 
Decrypt and get hash(token + password) from login 
  using c-token; 
Compare the locally generated hash(token + 
  password) with one from login; 
if there is a match then 
user is at this location; authenticate; 
else 
do not authenticate user; 
end if; 
Upon receiving ݉௥ , Loc-Auth will run Algorithm 3. 
However, as the token generated by Loc-Auth at time ݐ + ݀ + ߜ 
is different from the token utilized in ݉௥  (and that was valid 
during ݐ + ݀), authentication will fail. The results here are the 
same if, instead of recording and replaying ݉ , the attacker 
records and replays ݉௥ at time ݐ + ݀ + ߜ. 
B. Wormhole Attack 
Setup. Loc-Auth broadcasts encrypted message ݉  with 
token ऄࣽ at location ݈. An attacker at the same location listens 
to the medium and records ݉ at time ݐ. As in the replay attack, 
the attacker has knowledge of the original location ݈  of the 
broadcast and the time ݐ , but also has a direct network 
connection through a secondary channel to another location ݌. 
Normally, broadcasts in ݈ cannot be heard in ݌ and vice versa. 
Attack. Within the time slot ݐ + ݀ (wherein token ऄࣽ is still 
valid), the attacker broadcasts message ݉ at location ݌. 
Response of the system. A legitimate user listens to ݉ and 
runs Algorithm 2; replies with the encrypted login (reply 
message ݉௥) if she has the proper ABE secret keys. Loc-Auth, 
receiving ݉௥ , will run Algorithm 3. The token generated by 
Loc-Auth within time ݐ + ݀ at location ݌ is different from the 
token ऄࣽ utilized in ݉௥ , and that was generated at location ݈. 
Authentication will thus fail. Again, the results here are the same 
if, instead of recording and replaying ݉  from location ݈  to 
location ݌ , the attacker records and replays ݉௥  from one 
location to another, within time ݐ + ݀. 
C. Denial-of-Service Attack 
An attacker may perform a DoS attack by either (a) replaying 
previously recorded messages (broadcasts from the beacons, or 
reply messages from clients); (b) sending fake beacon or client 
messages; or (c) transmitting radio noise at the same frequencies 
as the Bluetooth beacons and clients, with such transmitting 
power and constancy as to disrupt legitimate communications 
between Loc-Auth and users. Bluetooth radios perform 
frequency hopping, in which the Bluetooth Master defines a 
hopping pattern, and then transmission will occur in different 
frequencies following the hopping pattern. This method 
mitigates the effects of radio jamming, since transmission can 
still occur in other frequencies that are not being jammed. 
Naturally, an applied attacker can still jam all possible Bluetooth 
frequencies. While it is technically complicated to resist such an 
attack, it is not problematic to uncover the attacker’s radio 
transmitter and have it disabled [8, 14]. 
In the event that location sign-on fails completely, the 
backend system or relying party (RP) will fall back to a full 
authentication request, without the location authentication 
factor. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We proposed Loc-Auth, a location-enabled authentication 
service. By using Loc-Auth, we design a sign-on scheme that 
utilizes the dynamic relationship between a user’s location, the 
available services at that location, and the user’s attributes as an 
additional authentication factor and thus enables a simplified 
sign-on to be performed in devices or backend systems nearby. 
Additionaly, the login session can “travel” with the user through 
different relying systems or devices as the user physically 
moves. Bluetooth Low-Energy beacons broadcast an encrypted 
message employing Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based 
Encryption (CP-ABE). A device in the user’s possession, such 
as a smartphone, and within range of the beacons captures the 
broadcast message. If the user has appropriate attributes, the 
smartphone is able to decrypt the broadcast message and 
engages in a login process on behalf of the user. The relying 
backend system terminal or device in the immediate vicinity, 
then, may allow for a simplified login from that user or accept a 
“traveling” login session, granted that the user’s location has 
been validated. 
Initial experimentation focuses on implementing the 
authentication algorithm. By means of simulation, we test the 
effectiveness of the service and simplified login scheme when 
users are within range of different beacon areas. Our future work 
involves investigating the security of the proposed scheme 
according to security models. In particular, the task is to prove 
the algorithms to be (a) semantically secure, secure under (b) 
chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) and under (c) chosen plaintext 
attacks (CPA). Moreover, we plan to investigate the issues of 
key revocation and update and analyze the performance of the 
model when subject to more attack vectors. 
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